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Mali's Socialism and the Soviet Legal Model*
John N. Hazardt
With Mali's option for socialism in 1960,1 its leaders turned toward
the Soviet Union in search of a model. Yet the model was not to be
copied exactly. There was to be no complete reception of Soviet polit-
ical and legal institutions. The 1960 Constitution2 established the
guidelines in its preamble: the Republic was "to organize the condi-
tions necessary to the harmonious evolution of the individual and the
family within the bosom of a modem society and with respect for the
African personality."
Modibo Keita told his 4,500,000 people on the first anniversary of
their independence, "Our socialism will not be for us the manifesta-
tion of a tendency to copy servilely what others have done."3 A year
later he complimented his Kremlin hosts in Moscow by saying at a
banquet, "Like you, we are sure of the triumph of socialism. That is
why we wanted to visit the sources of this idea, to see with our own
eyes, the life of your country and your successes."' 4 Yet Keita was an
African, and he was not to be overwhelmed, for he added, "Still, your
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1. See generally 2e SEMINAIRE DE L'UNION SOUDANAIS-R.DA. BAMAKO LFS 5.6.7 SrP''.
1962, at 23 (Bamako, no date) [hereinafter cited as 2e SEaNZAsP].
2. Law No. 60-1, Sept. 22, 1960, [1960] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA R PUDLIQUED. NI MALI
[hereinafter cited as JORM] No. 65, at III. This constitution was little changed front the
constitutions promulgated to serve the two stages through which the Repubic passed be'
fore emerging in its present form. After separation from France the territorial assembly of
Soudan declared the territory a "state" on Nov. 24, 1958, and a constitution for the"Rpublique Soudanais " was adopted on Jan. 23, 1959. On federati  with Senegal as
the "F~dration du Mali," the first constitution was revised appropriately by Law No,
60.23, July 26, 1960, [1960] JORM No. 62, at 699. The current constitution was promulgated
after separation from Senegal following the crisis of Aug. 20, 1960. Mali retained thename, national anthem a d flag of the federat on, while Senegal went its separat  way.
For a history of these events and the text of the current constitution, see 1 D. tAILOFI &
G. PsSER, La s CONs'rrrurxONS AF-, ANS 165 (1961).
3. M. KEA, DsscouPs Er INTERvENTONs 43 (Bamako---Moscow, 1965),
4. Speech by Keita at Kremlin Palace, May 22, 1962, reprinted in KZrrA, stpra note 8,
at 128.
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actual conditions and your methods would differ somewhat from ours."
He was for "assimilation" of the Soviet experience, not outright adop-
tion. His aim was to achieve the end already achieved by the Russians,
but to do so in his own way.
While Mali's creed, like that of her neighbors in Guinea and Sene-
gal, is a faith combining both socialism and the African component, it
is not identical. President LUopold S~dar Senghor argues that he has
created in Senegal a mutation of Marxism which deserves to be called
"African socialism," 5 but Keita makes no such claims to innovation.
Nor is Keita's way what President Ahmed S~kou Tour6 of Guinea
describes as the "non-capitalist way."0 For Mali's Marxist leaders, social-
ism in Africa is nothing but the traditional variety, the "universal
truth," even though integrated into the realities of Mali's social con-
text. One of Keita's Ministers reports, "We do not pretend to have
invented socialism in the Twentieth century, but simply to have sub-
jected it to the needs of our country."7
For analysts engaged in comparing the impact on legal institutions
of Marxian socialist inspiration, Mali offers a challenging perspective.
On the one hand her leaders have gone further in proclaiming their
desire to emulate Soviet models than have the Presidents of Senegal or
Guinea. On the other hand contemporary Mali is subject to the same
historical influences as her two neighbors to the west. She has behind
her sixty years of French civilization and legal culture and, as the
Malians say, a "millenium" of tribal life before that, and both of these
forces have left their mark upon the law.
The question to be explored in this study is the impact in an African
environment of what is proudly proclaimed as Marxian orthodoxy.
How far has what Mali calls the "universal truth" of Marxian-based
socialism, as embodied in the Soviet model, been adapted to meet the
social and economic conditions existing in a pivotal state located in
the African heartland? The answer may have international political
implications as well, for there are those who believe that a state which
borrows a model from a great power inclines to accept as well that
power's concept of international as well as domestic order.
5. For an analysis of Senegal's legal system based on an interview with Senghor, see
Hazard, Negritude, Socialism and the Law, 65 CoLU . L. REV. 778 (1965).
6. For an analysis of Guinea's legal system based on an interniew with Tourd, see
Hazard, Guinea's Non-capitalist Way, 5 CoLum. J. oF TRANs.;AT'L L. 231 (1966).
7. 2e SEwmIAImE 75.
The Yale Law Journal
The Leadership Component
Although Marx omitted analysis of leadership from his prescription
for the workers of the world in his Manifesto of 1848, he was quick to
fill the gap after the abortion of the weakly-led "Paris Commune" of
1871. Lenin embellished the point so emphatically that today the key-
stone of the Marxian legal system is everywhere acknowledged to be its
leadership core. It is sanctified in the Soviet constitution of 1936 and
in the public law of the thirteen other self-declared members of the
Marxian socialist legal "family." Whether the form chosen is the
single party of the Soviet model or the "leading party" dominating
smaller parties in a coalition as in Poland, the rule is clearly stated:
there can be no opposition party in the political life of a Marxist state.8
Of course, it is not sufficient merely to eliminate opposition. The
leadership must take a special form to fit within the model. It cannot
be a mass party open to all, but must become an elite, protecting itself
against dilution of its militancy through severe restriction of admission
to membership. It must exclude all but the militant individual pre-
pared to make self-sacrificing leadership his career. Repeated revela-
tions of careerist practices in Eastern Europe have not altered the
imperative laid down by Lenin in 1905. For the Marxian socialists
orthodoxy still requires, in the words of the declaration made jointly
by twelve communist parties in power in 1957,9 "guidance by the
working class, the core of which is the Marxist-Leninist party."
Mali's social architects have accepted only part of the rule on ortho-
dox leadership: they permit no opposition. Although the constitution
declares that normally suffrage is expressed through parties and poli-
tical groups,10 the "Union-Soudanaise-R.D.A." has in fact monopolized
political power. Its only opposition, the "Parti Soudanaise Progres.
siste," which was affiliated with the French socialists, and the "Parti du
Regroupement Soudanaise," were absorbed in 1958 even before Mali's
complete independence." When many of the former opposition leaders
8. To avoid encumbering this paper, citation to the Marxian-socialist legal model as
manifested in Eastern Europe is omitted herein. Citations may be found in J. HAZARD,
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE U.S.S.R. (1953), also in French and Spanish translation as
2 R. DAVID , J. HAZARD, LE DRorr SovIETIQuE (1954) and EL DERECHE SOVIETrco (1964).
See also Hazard, The Soviet Legal Pattern Spreads Abroad, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 277.
9. Declaration of the Twelve Communist Parties in Power, Nov. 1937, in Tim NEW
COMMUNIST MANsSro 169, 176 (2d ed. D. Jacobs 1962).
10. MALI CONSr. art. 3.
11. For histories of the early years, see F. SNYDER, ONE-PARTY GOVERN/MENT IN MALI:
TRANsrrION TOWARD CONTROL 9-79 (1965); SAmRI AMIN, Tnois .ARIENCES ArRICAINEs Dr
DAVELOPPEMENT: LE MALI, LA GUINIE Er LE GHANA 21-75 (1965).
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reappeared on the political scene in 1962, some were charged with
plotting subversion and, after admitting their guilt, were sentenced to
death.12
While the monopoly has thus conformed to orthodoxy in this re-
spect, it departs from the Soviet model on the point deemed cricital
by Lenin when he was finally able to organize his Russian Social Demo-
crats as he wished in 1905. Mali's party rejects the orthodox require-
ment that it include in its membership only the elite. It has been called
by its Political Secretary "the party of all the people,"13 thus drama-
tizing the fact that membership is not restricted to a single class.
In other respects Mali's party follows Lenin's prescriptions. Its mem-
bers, whatever the extent of their commitment on entry, may not re-
main mere sympathizers. By party rules they must promise to serve
militantly within its ranks,14 and party recruiters are advised that "plac-
ing party cards is not an end in itself."' " Potential members must be
told that membership means total engagement and sacrifice, and also
that "the training of the militants in political theory is an imperious
necessity." 16 The party must also be "avant-garde" and its members
must be models of selflessness. 17 Keita reaffirmed this rule in 1966 when
he told the party's youth, "I must again put the Party on guard against
the bourgeoisification of customs and the tendency to live beyond
means."'8 These themes ring sufficiently true to Lenin's to weaken the
contrast provided by the rejection of his elitism.
Still the concept of the party as the "party of all the people," which
has been the Malian formula since the early days, would have been
unthinkable in other Marxian-oriented societies until the Soviet Com-
munist Party's adoption of the same phrase in its program of 1961.
Prior to that time communist parties had to be "proletarian class
parties" to meet the test of Marxian orthodoxy. While the Chinese
12. DuBois, Mali Five Years after the Referendum, AmERCAN UNIVERsrry Fzrw STAFr
R1PoaTs SEavicas, VI 'I= AFmcA SEpam, No. 3 at 12 (1963). The death sentences were
commuted to life imprisonment at hard labor, but the principal leaders were reported
killed under mysterious circumstances in 1964 in northeastern Mali, reputedly when a
convoy transporting them from one prison to another was attacked.
13. We CONGRtS DE L'UNION SOUDANAISE R.D.A.-BA~mo mS 10-11-12 SEPr. 19G2. 107
(Bamako, 1963) [hereinafter cited as VIe CONcRi]. Part of the proceedings of the Vo
Congras are reported in English translation in F. SNyDER, supra note 11, at 134-52.
14. Rule 3. For rules, see VIe CONGcRtS 107, translated in F. SN-YDE, supra note 11, at 134.
supra note 11, at 134.
15. Ve CONoGis 118.
16. Id. 123.
17. 2e SEhmNAzE 17.
18. Speech on Sixth Anniversary of Independence, given Sept. 22, 1966, reprinted in
L" Fssor, Sept. 26, 1966, at 4, col. 4.
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party has waxed vitriolic in its criticism of Soviet leaders for sponsoring
the new formula, Khrushchev justified the change on the theory that,
with the complete elimination of capitalists and classes as a result of
the revolution in the ownership of productive wealth, the class struggle
in the Soviet Union was at an end. He thought that the absence of
class enemies in Soviet society left the party free to evolve into a party
of all the people, but he did not go so far as to conclude that it should
therefore be opened to all. The new Russian formula only eliminated
class as a membership requirement. The elite concept characterized by
limitation of numbers as well as by insistance upon total engagement
was preserved as a cardinal element of the leadership role which the
party continued to play.
Malians' unorthodox characterization of their party springs from
their belief that "the question of class is quasi-nonexistent.""u They
admit to having different strata in their society, but insist that "there
are absolutely no violent contradictions between them, no relation-
ships of exploiters to exploited." Nationalism is, therefore, "neither
feudal nor bourgeois in form, but is truly a nationalism of the whole
people." Moreover, not only do Malians see no capitalism, but they
find no need to develop it as a predecessor to socialism. In support of
this conclusion, they cite a 1920 address to the Communist Interna-
tional in which Lenin argued that the capitalist stage could be skipped
by backward countries moving to socialism after the first world war.20
With no class struggle to worry about, the monopoly party requires no
class component to fight its battles. It need not even follow Guinea's
example in attacking that fringe group of capitalists, the merchants.
Even they may join the party if they share its goals.
In organization the Malian party is orthodox. Thus, "democratic
centralism" as prescribed by Lenin is the organizing principle and it
is described in traditional terms: "Acceptance of the law of the ma-
jority within our organization; acceptance by the minority which has
taken a position on a given subject of the duty to defend the solution
adopted by the majority."21 This rule is accompanied by the familiar
Marxian prescriptions:
The spirit of discipline is the base principle; a decision once
taken must be accepted by the militant even if he has proposed a
different solution. No one may conduct a campaign for the can.
19. 2e S-MINAuE 74.
20. Id. 75.
21. Vie CoNca.s 128.
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didacy of a militant before the latter is nominated by a competent
organization. The party may take sanctions running from warning
to exclusion.
22
On the other hand, every member is left free to express his views, so
long as he refrains from organizing a faction to support them. =
On only one point of party discipline is there a striking contrast with
the Soviet model. The party "has erected as a fundamental principle
freedom of religious opinion."2 4 This concession goes farther than that
of the Soviet constitution, which extends a guarantee of freedom of con-
science to the citizen; the Malian guarantee extends to party members
as well, for there is no requirement that a member be an atheist. On
the contrary, Keita has expressly rejected atheism. In a 1962 speech
to the students of journalism he asked,
How then, it is said, can religion and socialism be conciliated?
I say that the question rests on heresy. If in the Republic of Mali
religion had been the instrument of oppression and domination, if
it had made itself the agent of the colonial system, or even if in
our remote past it had been an instrument of the fuedal system,
if it had played the role of poison, as a factor making for resigna-
tion, then the struggle could be justified.2 5
After distinguishing the Malian experience from the conditions
cited by Marx to show that religion is the opium of the people, and
by Lenin to justify the destruction of religious institutions in Russia
as instruments of the Tsarist state, Keita went on to embrace Islam
as socialism's own. He declared, "There is no religion more socialist
than the Moslem religion, because it teaches among its principles that
the rich must give to the poor, must divide their goods in order to
relieve the suffering of others."2
Party structure in Mali is mindful of that of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union. There is the familiar pyramid, resting on the
comitd at the level of the village, the city quartier and the nomadic
fraction. Above is the sous-section in the geographically defined arron-
dissement and above that the section at the level of the cercle in the
state administrative apparatus.27 Crowning the pyramid is the Party
Congress, which elects its National Political Bureau. Each level is di-
22. 2e SiniNAnm 15.
23. Id. 16.
24. Id. 17.
25. M. KrrA, supra note 3, at 107-08.
26. Id. 108.
27. Vie CONGP&S 144.
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rected by an executive committee, which looks upward as well as to
its parent body for guidance.
What structural variation on the Soviet model there is stems from
the fact that Mali's party originally made no organization in the fac-
tories and ministries along production lines. Lenin had insisted that
such organization was essential, but only since 1962 has Mali's Party
begun to move in this direction.28 Then, it authorized creation of
"political groups," designed to play a role as "brigades of socialist
labor" in factories and shops. These groups, however, are not basic
membership units like their Soviet counterparts, but rather coordinat-
ing units for those who belong to comitds in different quarters but
work together in the same place.
This Malian variation from Lenin's pattern may be the result of
three factors: (1) a dissimilar history, in that Mali's comites, unlike
the original Russian soviets, did not originate as conspiratorial groups
created by workers to fight the regime from as secure a position as
possible; (2) the absence until recently of more than a very few indus-
trial units in Mali; and (3) the emphasis upon all the people rather
than upon a class as the Party's base, making organization by class
groups unnecessary.
The supporting youth organizations follow Soviet models, 29 except
that in 1962 the top leadership committee of Malian youth was abol-
ished, for fear that its chief might become a contender for political
power.a0 Direction was passed to the National Political Bureau of the
Party to assure conformity to official policy.31 The Soviet model calls
for indirect control, to be exercised by over-age members of the Party
strategically placed in the various levels of the youth organizations,
but Mali's 1962 decision abandoned this method of control altogether
by establishing a maximum age limit of 25 for all members.
3 2
Younger recruits belong, as in the U.S.S.R., to the "Pioneers," which
enlists children from the ages of 7 to 18. Its mission is the same as that
in the Soviet model: to educate youth in all fields, political, economic,
civic, cultural, social and artistic. 33 In deference to venerable custom,
women, who have always been fully integrated in the party structure
28. Id. 180. English translation in F. SNYDER, supra note 11, at 144.
29. Vie CoNGR-s 146.
30. DuBois, supra note 12, at 7.
31. Vie CONGRiS 180.
52. A resolution to restore the top age limit to 30 was adopted by the Youth organiza.
tion in April, 1966, but it awaits approval of a Party Congress before becoming effective.
33. Vie CONGR.S 147.
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in the U.S.S.R. without a separate organization, have had to be orga-
nized separately in Mali.
The collegial system of leadership is espoused at all levels in the
Malian party,34 as it is in principle in the U.S.S.R., but Malians have
faced some of the same temptations of power and some of the same
needs for strong leadership as have the Soviet Communists. Personal-
ization of leadership has forced Modiba Keita to the fore, and his
personality has left a strong imprint upon the Party. He is so greatly
praised and revered that at least one outside observer has found a
"cult of personality" around him.3 r Readers of the Party's newspaper,
L'Essor, can see a resemblance to Stalin's Pravda. Still, there is no
Malian "Stalinism." Keita is more like Nikita Khrushchev, a first
among equals, and another outsider has concluded that Keita has no
choice but to maintain the collegial form because the Political Bureau's
power is actually shared among its members, who speak for the large
ethnic and regional groups they severally represent. 0 Even had he
the will to do so, no individual could become a dictator at present.
Party-State Relations
The concept of the Party as a party of all the people, open to all, has
not brought its leaders to conclude with Sckou Tour6 in Guinea that
there can be a merger of party and state organs at the local level. For
the Malians the Party "conceives" and the state "executes." The Coun-
cil of Ministers as the supreme executive has the duty of guiding the
administrative apparatus in execution of tasks set by the Party. Lenin's
admonition that there be a minimum of crossing of lines is honored by
a rule that no party official or organization shall substitute himself or
itself for an administrator.37
As in the U.S.S.R., administrators are reminded that their duty is
to seek advice from responsible political officials because all administra-
tive acts have political repercussions. 8 Similarly, party people must
advise when advice seems necessary. Mali has faced the same problem
of balance between party and administration which beset the Soviet
Union, especially during the war and under Khrushchev's policy of
34. Id. 180.
35. F. SNiDE:E, supra note 11, at 112.
36. DuBois, supra note 12, at 5.
37. 2e SE msrAnl 18-19.
38. An African political scientist concludes that in Mali constitutional organs are
subordinated to Party organs more than-in-Guinea. SEYDou AAm SY,, Rcmmcms sun
LEXERCISE DES POUVOIRS EN A-RIQUE Noa: COTE D'IVoIRE, GuINEE, NIALI 165-65 (1965).
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direct party concern with agriculture. Mali's party people have found
it hard to resist putting their hands to the wheel as well as their pens
to paper, but the rule is still embodied in the three principles of
orthodoxy expressed by the slogan, "primacy of politics, non-meddling
and politico-administrative coordination." 39 Further, an administra-
tive official is required to be militant, at whatever level he serves.
"His first duty is to apply the principles of the Party."40 As in the
Soviet system, there is no concept of the apolitical civil servant above
the political fray. The Party says that no administrator can be per-
mitted for lack of political acumen to shake public confidence, to make
the public regret the passing of the colonial regime, or even to remind
it of the old methods.
Leadership is not stressed to the exclusion of mass participation, but
this latter desideratum is not pressed as strongly in Mali as in the
Soviet Union. Mali makes the familiar claim that "the practice of de-
mocracy goes well beyond classic democracy," 4' but the fact belies the
theory. There is always a veto at the center.
At the village level there is in fact a measure of mass participation
through a village council,4 2 which is elected by universal suffrage and
may include women as well as men.43 It serves as a deliberative organ,
but operates primarily as a conciliator. It must resolve disputes over
land and property matters, i.e. administration of the common fields,
ponds, rivers, forests and quarries, and it must deal with economic
problems concerning the whole village community. It is also charged
with maintaining public order, protecting individuals and their prop-
erty, administering the local police and supervising certain health mat-
ters, the streets, the trails and diverse financial matters. These councils
have been called "a marvelous school for apprenticeship in democracy
and administration of public affairs." 44 Lenin conceived of his soviets
similarly. Yet while the village soviet in the U.S.S.R. elects its own
executive committee, the Malian village council can only nominate the
"village chief"; he is appointed by the central government. He is thus
even more directly dependent on the center than the soviet village
executive, although Lenin's system of dual subordination does make
the latter both subservient to the executive committee of the next
39. 2e SnMINAR E 19.
40. Id. 29.
41. Id. 30.
42. These were organized within the R~publique Soudanaise by Ordinance No, 43
D.I., March 28, 1959, and were continued by Mali.
48. Law No. 68-82 AN, May 31, 1963, [1963] JORM No. 147, at 382.
44. 2e SEmiNAiRE 31.
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higher soviet in the hierarchy and responsible to the soviet from which
the local executive committee's authority stems.
"Alongside the village council, organ of administration and execu-
tion, is the political apparatus of the community, elected by all the
militants of the village: the village comitd." 5 The comitd's function
with relation to the village council is stated in orthodox terms as,
"first of all the role of mobilization in the bosom of the masses, which
it is charged to educate." Current Marxist-Leninist manuals in the
U.S.S.R. call this "directed democracy."
Municipalities are governed as "communes" through a popularly
elected Municipal Council,4 6 which chooses the Mayor and his dep-
uties from its members. Varying in size from 17 to 61 depending on
the size of the city, a Council's life continues until it is dissolved by
the National Assembly, although its activities may be suspended by
decision of the Council of Ministers for periods of up to three months.
It does provide a vehicle for mass participation in public life, but its
practical authority is limited. On nine enumerated critical legislative
matters, it can do no more than give advice and express wishes unless
it has the consent of the Minister of the Interior. Large expenditures
and borrowing of any size must be approved by the Council of Minis-
ters itself.
At intermediate levels there are further departures from the Soviet
model of public representation, for here the Malian masses do not
participate at all. Where the Soviet system has an assembly, Mali
places a "chief" between the village and the cercle, in what is called in
continuation of French terminology the arrondissement.47 Named by
the central authorities and directly subordinated to the commandant of
the cercle, these 226 officials are indubitably the center's men. Their
critical political importance is evidenced by the rule that they must be
political figures of proven responsibility. They must not only admin-
ister but share in the political education of the Party's comitds within
their district. Thus, they combine formally in their persons both party
and state lines of authority as is never the case in the U.S.S.R.-and as
would indeed seem superfluous to the Soviet party, since the chiefs
operate in an area in which there is already a sous-section of the Party
capable, one would suppose, of political education of the comitds in the
45. Id.
46. Law No. 66-9 AN, March 31, 1966, [1966] JORM No. 218, at VIL
47. See MAUI CoNsr. art. 41 for territorial divisions. For comments on the role of the
cercle, see 2e Smmam= 82-83.
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arrondissement. These remarkable figures, heirs to the old tribal chiefs,
have the additional function of conciliation of civil and commercial
disputes between villages or between residents of different villages.
The commandants of the 42 cercles are similarly conceived. Named
by the Governor of the next higher unit, the Region, they represent
central authority, but they maintain a special relation to the Party
at their level as ex officio members of the political bureau of the Party's
section.48 Through this device Malians attempt to maintain what the
U.S.S.R. seeks through the medium of the county assemblies of the
soviets, namely close coordination between the administrative appa-
ratus and the local residents on economic, social and cultural matters.
The same administrative pattern is repeated at the regional level,
although here there is a beginning of a movement toward closer sim-
ilarity to the Soviet system. The six Regional Governors are named
by the center, but are instructed to work closely with the Party organs
in the Region's cercles, arrondissements and villages, though they do
not enjoy membership in any of these bodies. 49 The Governors' pri-
mary function is formulation and execution of the economic plan for
the Regions, and to aid them in this task a commission to regulate
financial matters was established in each of their offices in 1962.
Its members are the responsible Party officers in all sections of the
Region, the resident National Assembly deputies, and the comman-
dants of the cercles. The financial commission was to be expended
eventually into a Regional Assembly to be elected by universal suffrage
in the manner of the provincial assemblies of the U.S.S.R., but the
expansion has not occurred, perhaps because such an assembly might
prove to be a means of undermining the Governor's power at a time
in the nation's history when centralization seems necessary to stability.
At the top is a National Assembly and a Council of Ministers, pre-
sided over by a President who is elected by the Assembly at the opening
of each five year term.50 This official serves simultaneously as Chief of
State, and now bears the tide "President of the Republic."'" To a
French specialist the pattern is "profoundly original" in French-speak-
ing Africa.52 The President of the Republic with his government is
48. 2e SEmINAIm 5.
49. Id. 37. Law No. 65-22 AN, April 1, 1965, which concerned the powers of the
Regional Governors was not found.
50. MALT CONsT. art. 7.
51. Constitutional law No. 65-9 AN, art. 6, April 16, 1965, [1965] JORM No. 195, at 167,
52. 1 D. LAVROEE & G. PEISER, supra note 2, at 164. The post of Vice-President of the
Council of Ministers, originally established by the constitution, has been abolished for the
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responsible to the Assembly, but, in emulation of the French model,
the Assembly is automatically dissolved if two ministerial crises occur
within tventy-four months. The eighty deputies of the Assembly are
elected on a single list prepared by the monopoly PartyO and none is
assigned to a specific district. This system is designed to promote
identification with national rather than regional interests.
As might be expected under the Malian non-class approach, suffrage
is open to all except certain criminals. There is no effort to exclude
bourgeois elements, as there was under Soviet constitutions prior to
1936. 54
Party concern with the details of state affairs was increased in 1966
by creation within the Central Secretariat of five committees: for
politics, for economic and financial matters, for administrative and
judicial matters, for social and cultural affairs, and for the press. These
committees are charged with making "profound" studies of all matters
of interest to both Party and State. In a sense they assume some state
functions, for they are described as "veritable departments at the level
of the National Political Bureau; functioning with well-tried cadres,
they must be veritable instruments of affirmation of the primacy of
the Party." 55 In a speech two days after formation of the commissions,
Keita reaffirmed their fundamental purpose:
I should remind you once more of the primacy of the Party over
the administrative and legislative organs, which is embodied in
the right of all levels of the Party to conceive the whole policy
of the country (economic, social and cultural) and by the right
to see to the execution at the same level of that which has been
conceived and whose execution is the task of administrative and
legislative organs. 5
Economic Planning and Financial Credit
The dimensions of the new state's economic problems were set forth
by the Ministry of Planning in 1959, while Mali was still in federation
stated purpose of avoiding confusion of authority. Law No. 61-25 AN, Jan. 20, 191, [1961]
JORAM No. 80, at 245.
53. Ordinance No. 65 bis on the Electoral Law, Nov. 24, 1960, [1960] JORM No. 73, at I.
54. Law No. 63-73 AN, Dec. 26, 1963, [1964] JORM No. 163. at 165.
55. "Session Ordinaire de Bureau Politique National," Sept. 20, 1966, LEssor, Sept.
26, 1966, at 8, col. 4.
56. Speech on Sixth Anniversary of Independence, Sept. 22, 1966, L'Essor, Sept. 26,
1966, at 3, col. 3. Dramatic evidence of the interrelationship is provided by a protocol
ranking of Party and State officials, issued as a guide to foreign diplomats and others
needing to be informed of precedence of rank when both Party and State officials are
present on the same occasion. See 271, PG, Nov. 26, 1962, [1962] JORM No. 133, at 932.
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with Senegal. 57 Per capita income was $56 a year, less than that of India
and the Belgian Congo, while per capita consumption, to the extent
that it could be determined by household accounts, was about $50 per
year, placing Mali below the average among all former French colonies
The rural population constituted 92 per cent of the whole, and ac-
counted for 60 per cent of the country's total consumption, but per
capita food consumption was much lower than in most other countries
of sub-Sahara Africa.
A second report in 196358 provided insight into the industrial and
commercial complex. At the end of 1962, there were only 883 function-
ing "enterprises," of which 44 were engaged in agricultural pursuits
and 44 more in industrial. The rest were in commerce and banking
(289), the liberal professions (51), transportation (43), construction (32)
and public services (380). These enterprises employed a total of 18,823
salaried workers. 9 The number of employees in state enterprises was,
however, expanding rapidly in number as additional socialist policies
were put into effect.
Marxian socialists' greatest pride is state economic planning, and
Mali's leaders began immediately after independence to construct a
typical system. The constitution gives the National Assembly authority
to fix fundamental principles for the organization of production. 0
A Committee of Economic Direction was established in 1960, to which
the Ministry of Economic Direction submits proposals."' A Planning
Ministry was put in place, within which were formed a Planning and
General Statistical Service 2 and an Action Rurale to aid in forming
cooperatives and in drafting legislation on the subject.0 3 The first com-
pulsory plan was inaugurated on July 1, 1961, to run for five years, but
it was subsequently frequently revised downward. In 1964, the Na-
tional Assembly adopted a less ambitious investment schedule for
economic and social development, 64 and the year 1966 brought still
57. RAPUBLIQUE DU MALI, MINISfRE DU PLAN ET DE LA COORDINATION DES AFFAIRS
ECONOMIQUES r FINANCitRE, COMPTES ECONOMIQUES DE LA RLPUBLIQUE DU MALI 1959, at 2
(Bamako, no date).
58. RIPUBLIQUE DU MALI, MINISTPRE D'J.TAT CHARGe' DU PLAN Er DE LA COORDINATION DES
AFFAIRES ECONOMIQUES ET FINANCItRES, SERVICE DE LA STATISQUE CGN"iALE ET DE LA COM1i-
TABILITE NATIONALE, BULLETIN ANNUEL DE LA CONJUNCTION, SITUATION ECONOMI(QtE DU
MALI Au 31 DEC. 1962 (April 1963).
59. Id. 20.
60. MALI CONST. art. 24.
61. Decree No. 268, Oct. 12, 1960, [1960] JORM No. 68, at 853.
62. Law No. 61-65 AN, May 18, 1961, [1961] JORM No. 90, at XXII, reorganized by
Decree No. 46 PG, April 4, 1964, [1964] JORM No. 169, at 358.
63. Law No. 61-66 AN, May 16, 1961, [1961] JORM No. 90, at XXIL
64. Law No. 63-95 AN, Jan. 25, 1964, [1964] JORM No. 162, at 104.
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further revision of the plan in the direction of retrenchment. The 1966
"budget of consolidation" sought equilibrium between needs and
means through a limitation of imports destined for current consump-
tion on the one hand and an increase in production on the other.
Agriculture was favored so as to expand the essential base of the econ-
omy, but the budget for industrial equipment was cut proportionately.
Heeding Lenin's strictures on the need for control of credit, Mali's
leaders established exchange controls immediately after separation
from Senegal.65 This measure was followed by a law requiring private
insurance companies to invest in Mali 5 per cent of their 1960 pre-
miums-and all profits in excess of the required reserves thereafter-
under a program to be approved by the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry.66 Banking came under the control of a Malian Credit Council
charged with establishing a credit policy for the republic, coordinating
banking, and issuing currency. 7 A Savings Bank system to be admini-
stered within the post offices was created at the same time. 9
The state early assumed the role of principal banker to the economy.
After 1960, national enterprises were financed by the "Banque Pop-
ulaire du Mali," a state bank created expressly for that purpose.09
Another important bank was a mixed company, whose capital was
provided jointly by the state treasury and the renowned French Credit
Lyonnais.70 But in 1962, the government administered a virtual coup
de grdce to foreign banking. It severed its links with the Franc zone by
establishing a new Central Bank7' and issuing its own currency 72 in
place of the French African Community francs it had previously used.
Keita went before the National Assembly to explain the necessity for
this radical step, saying,
Dear colleagues, as far as we go back in time history teaches us
that political power always and necessarily is accompanied by the
65. Ordinance No. 13 P.C., Sept. 17, 1960, referred to in SYMou MAY3ANi SY, supra note
38, at 51. The regulation on exchange control is Decision of Nov. 20, 1960, [1960] JORMA
No. 73, at IV.
66. Decree No. 139 PG, April 6, 1961, [1961] JORM No. 83, at 381. Forign insurance
companies were regulated further by decree No. 32 PG, March 9, 1954, [1961] JORIM No.
167, at 263.
67. Decree No. 155 PG, April 6, 1961, [1961] JORM No. 83, at 383.
68. Decree No. 171 PG, April 20, 1961, [1961] JORM No. 83, at 404.
69. The statute has not been found, but the fact is stated in Ssvnou ?AUmk.[ SY, supra
note 38, at 51.
70. The statute has not been found, but the fact is stated in 2c S2.imw=n 63.
71. Law No. 62-55 AN, June 30, 1962, [19621 JORM No. 120, at I. The Central Bank was
expanded in 1964 to include the Central Office of Mutual Agricultural Credit. Law No.
64-2 AN, May 14, 1964, [1964] JORM No. 172, at 434.
72. Law No. 62-54 AN, June 30, 1962, [1962] JORM No. 120, at IHI.
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royal power to coin money, that monetary power is inseparable
from national sovereignty, that it is the indispensable complement
of it, the essential attribute.
73
The French banks by and large saw the handwriting on the wall and
withdrew. The Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et 1'Industrie
closed on January 6, 1963, followed closely by the Banque du Com-
merce Africain on February 15. Only the Banque de 'Afrique Occi-
dentale remained as a representative of the private bankers. Its build-
ing still stands on one of Bamako's main streets, presenting a distinctive
appearance of affluence. Some say it is protected because it has ad-
vanced important credits to Malian state enterprises,74 but the major
credit source for such state development is now the Central Bank,
which absorbed the Banque Populaire on January 25, 1963.75
Industry and Commerce
While leaving a semblance of private enterprise in the banking field,
like all orthodox Marxists Mali's leaders have sought to capture the
commanding industrial and commercial heights. Under the economic
plan of July 1, 1961, development of all new industries operating as
textile factories, slaughter houses, refrigeration plants, petroleum re-
fineries, canning plants, and sources of construction materials is mon-
opolized by the state.76 But even before this, the state was reaching into
existing private enterprises. An important company exploiting naviga-
tion and associated activities in the Niger River valley was recreated
in 1960 as a mixed company to which the government and the Soci6t6
des Messageries Africaines jointly contributed the capital.7 7 The gov-
ernment's shares were made non-transferable, as were the private com-
pany's shares for the first two years. Later, in 1962, the private shares
were bought by the state and a new company formed as a public corpo-
ration.
78
Following the same pattern the state assumed responsibility in stages
for the Bamako airport,7 Air Mali,80 electric and water services,
81
73. Speech to the National Assembly, June 30, 1962, in M. KmTA, supra note 3, at
141-42.
74. DuBois, supra note 12, at 15.
75. Law No. 63-27 AN, Jan. 25, 1963, [1963] JORM No. 138, at 120.
76. SAMIR AMIN, supra note 11, at 77-78.
77. Law No. 60-25, Aug. 8, 1960, [1960] JORM No. 62.
78. Law No. 62-11, Jan. 15, 1962, [1962] JORM No. 110, at 115.
79. Ordinance No. 30 PG, Oct. 26, 1960, [1960] JORM No. 69, at 893.
80. Ordinance No. 31 PG, Oct. 27, 1960, [1960] JORM No. 69, at 894.
81. Ordinance No. 26 PGP, Oct. 14, 1960, [1960] JORM No. 73, at I, as amended by
concession contract, Law No. 62-58 AN, Aug. 6, 1962, [1962] JORM No. 125, at 533.
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railroadso 2 posts and telegraph,83 petroleum exploitation,4 canning,ss
brickmaking,6 hotel management,8 7 and public worksss For all, the
final institutional form was the public corporation, created in the
image of the enterprise developed by Lenin beginning in 1923 and
since adopted as the standard operating unit for state economic activity
throughout the Marxian socialist world.80
A model statute for public corporations was enacted in 1963.00
Existing statutes were reissued in the new form,9' which begins with a
preamble in Marxist language reading,
Born in the struggle for economic independence of the country,
the national enterprises are a decisive victory for the toilers of
the Republic of Mali. These enterprises belong to the entire
Malian people; they are the people's property. The exploitation
of man by man is abolished in them once and for all, and a new
type of labor is beginning to develop in them. In these enterprises
the toilers work for all of society-for themselves. To protect and
increase continually the property of the People in these enter-
prises is, therefore, the duty of every toiler.
Mali's leadership is concerned only with the commanding economic
heights, not with the entire economy as the U.S.S.R. model requires.
A 1962 law92 establishing the terms for private investment makes this
dear. The Ministry of Planning was authorized to sign conventions
authorizing investment with "all enterprises whose activity presents
a special interest for the Malian economy and whose creation or invest-
ment program concurs with the provisions of the plan of economic and
social development of the Republic of Mali."
Investment was limited to production facilities by the simple device
of a clause excluding commercial enterprises, from the regime.03 The
82. Ordinance No. 62 bis PGP, Nov. 29, 1960, [1961) JORM No. 78, at X.
83. Ordinance No. 62 PGP, Nov. 29, 1960. [1961] JORM No. 78, at ',rfL
84. Law No. 6241 AN, April 24, 1962, [1962] JORM No. 118, at 372.
85. Ordinance not found creating the enterprise, but it was given irrigated land from
Office du Niger by Decree No. 93 PG, May 7, 1963, [1963] JORM No. 145, at 319. Use was
for an unlimited period of time.
86. Law No. 63-50 AN, May 31, 1963, [19631 JOR No. 147 at 386.
87. Law No. 64-23 AN, July 15, 1964, [19631 JOnM No. 183, at XII. The corporation
was placed under the Ministry of Information and Tourism. No monopoly was created
over hotels. The Majestic, a private hotel of considerable size, continues to function in
Bamrako.
88. Law No. 65-9 AN, March 13, 1965, [1965] JORM No. 195, at 179.
89. Provisions governing administration are set forth below in the paragraphs devoted
to labor.
90. Jan. 26, 1963. Statute not found but identified in $EYDou %LADANI SY, supra note 38,
at 49.
91. Law No. 63-65 AN, Dec. 26, 1963, [19641 JORM No. 162, at 112.
92. Law No. 62-5 AN, Jan. 5, 1962, [1962] JORM No. 110, at 112.
93. Id.§4.
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Malians were showing typical Marxist aversion to the middleman as
a non-contributor to value, but they were also acting out of fear. They
considered the merchants a potential threat to the regime, and history
proved the fear well-founded. On July 20, 1962, public demonstrations
developed in the Bamako market of such magnitude that the police
found it necessary to make 250 arrests, and the former leaders of the
pre-independence opposition were tried for inciting the merchants to
treason.94
Under the investment code any enterprise with which a convention
is signed has the right to retransfer the investment, but on the expira-
tion of the term, buildings and installations revert to the state without
indemnity. 5 A model convention was attached to the statute. The
state can limit profits by taking advantage of a clause which permits
state representatives to share with the enterprise's owners in establish-
ing the production plan and in fixing prices. In practice foreign com-
panies have been permitted to repatriate annually 25 per cent of their
profits, but the remaining 75 per cent must be reinvested within Mali
in keeping with the provisions of the economic plan.90
Fear of merchants also led to a policy of control of foreign commerce,
which has always been vital to the Malian economy. Pharmaceuticals
were placed immediately in the hands of a public corporation.T An-
other public corporation named SOMIEX was created within the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry to monopolize trade in the
primary export product, peanuts, and eleven basic imports.08 Rural
cooperatives were required to sell and buy only through it. Other
public corporations soon monopolized all agricultural exports from
the Niger Valley9" and the export of hides.100
Outside foreign commerce, however, Malian policy called only for
price control and for licensing of those private merchants who were
94. DuBois, supra note 12, at 8-12.
95. Law No. 62-5 AN, § 18, Jan. 5, 1962, [1962] JORM No. 110, at 112. For examples of
concession agreements, see that with Tranduy Co. S.A. of Geneva to install a laboratory to
package and test pharmaceuticals in Bamako, Decree No. 225 PG, Nov. 13, 1963, [1963]
JORM No. 158, at 699, and that with Compagnie Franqaise pour le D6veloppement du
Textile to provide individual assistance, Decree No. 44 PG, April 1, 1964, [1964] JORM
No. 168, at 294.
96. DuBois, supra note 12, at 15.
97. Ordinance No. 18, Oct. 15, 1960, [1960] JORM No. 67, at 808.
98. Ordinance No. 33, Oct. 29, 1960, [1960] JORM No. 69, at 899.
99. Ordinance, No. 49 PGP, Nov. 18, 1960, creating "Office du Niger" [1960] JORM No.
70, at 948.
100. Decree No. 12 PG, Feb. 2, 1964, creating "Sonea," [1964] JORM No. 163, at 181,
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to function in domestic markets. A 1961 decree'01 regulated prices in
an all-inclusive manner:
The importation, exportation, circulation, manner of fixing
prices; the detention, declaration, and control of inventories;
the use; the putting up for sale; the advertising of prices for all
products and articles of merchandise of whatever origin and
source are regulated by decrees.
All merchants must now be licensed under a 1964 statute,10 2 designed
to assure stability and open dealing. While many of the Lebanese
formerly doing business have chosen to leave Mali rather than remain
under the restrictions, retail trade is still in private hands, though the
merchants have little freedom to choose their sources of supply or to
set their prices.
When special knowledge is required, Mali's policies have been shown
to be sufficiently flexible to admit private enterprise into export indus-
tries as well, but only in the form of mixed companies. Thus a Society
for the Exportation of Animal Products0 3 was chartered in 1965. The
state owned the majority of shares, but the private investors, known as
the "Group Mothes," were given half the seats on the administrative
council of six members. The state kept the key places, however, reserv-
ing the posts of president and director general for its appointees, and
obliging the private group to be content with the deputy directorship.
Moreover, the private directors had to deposit at least 15 shares as a
guarantee of honest direction, while the government's directors were
not even obliged to own, much less deposit, any shares. Similarly, in
1965 the radioelectric industry was placed in the hands of a mixed
company with 4,000 shares, of which the state was required to hold
60 per cent. Again, an equally divided administrative council of four
members was established, of which the president must be Malian. 04
Keita explained his policy on private enterprise in 1963 as aimed pri-
marily at maintaining equilibrium in the state's balance of payments,
through control of foreign commerce in accordance with the provisions
of the economic plan. As to merchants, he added,
I know that some merchants are experiencing difficulties in the
exercise of their customary pursuits; but since evolution necessar-
101. Decree No. 185 PG, March 2, 1961, [1961] JOlur No. 86, at 1, as amended,
Decree No. 224 PG, June 6, 1961, [19611 JORfM No.89, at I.
102. Decree No. 189 PG, Dec. 24, 1964, [19641 JORMU No. 188, at 31.
103. Law No. 65-28 AN, July 2, 1965, [1965] JORM No. 202, at 387.
104. Law No. 65-36 CP-AN, Sept. 13, 1965, [1965] JORM No. 207, at 525.
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ily creates selection, it is indispensable that those who lack their
own resources and who lived under a system of mercantilism dur-
ing the period of the colonial regime, and who were accomplices
in the exploitation of the rural masses by the great foreign com-
panies reconvert themselves to become more useful to themselves
and to their country.105
He inveighed against fraudulent trade, but assured merchants who
conformed to Malian laws that they could count on the Party's desire
to sacrifice no stratum of the population, at least so long as the favored
strata fully understand their duty and renounce their surplus so that
others may live and develop.
Mali's leader was declaring no such war against merchants as S6kou
Tour6 has waged in Guinea, but he was giving his private merchants
only a limited role to play under the watchful eye of the Party and
the security apparatus intent upon avoiding a repetition of the Bamako
market rebellion of 1962. He reaffirmed this position in 1967 at the
time of devaluation of the currency. Merchants were castigated for
smuggling, but the attack was not directed at them as a class. Those
who had remained honest were praised by the government for their
proper civic conduct.10 6
Land and Agriculture
Land law was undergoing revision even before Mali's separation
from France. A 1957 decree had established a socialist theme by pro-
viding that in specially designated territories, "lands acquired by con-
cession which have not been put in a condition enhancing their value
under the law of May 3, 1946 within five years, shall be wholly or partly
transferred to the national domain."lo 7 The decree promised an indem-
nity amounting to the original cost, adjusted to take into account the
increase in living costs, plus the registration fee and the value of any
improvements not "sumptuous."
The new Malian government built on this foundation early in 1961
with a law providing that "every building plot or land whose title has
been registered but which has been abandoned for six consecutive
105. New Year's Speech to the People of Mali, 1963 in M. KArA, supra note 8, at
201-04.
106. Speech of Louis Negre, May 5, 1967, Quotidien d'Information, Agence Natlonale
d'Information du Mali, May 9, 1947, No. 946 (mimeo).
107. For an historical account see Blanc, Chronique foncihre: Quelques los Guindens el
Maliennes Rdcentes, 72 REcEL PENA'T 297 (1962).
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years shall be considered as vacant and incorporated in the national
domain."' 018 The commandant of the cercie establishes vacancy at a
hearing with notice, and claimants have three months to establish their
case. No indemnity is paid, on the theory that the land reverts to the
state by prescription.
Fairness in transactions involving land transfers or mortgages was
the subject of two accompanying decrees of January, 1961. By the first,
all transfers of land whether by sale or gift, as well as any act creating
an interest in land by mortgage, usufruct or long-term lease, must be
submitted to preliminary approval by the government on pain of
nullity. °0 9 The second provisionally suspends all existing law on the
sale of land by forced expropriation. n In addition in May a new pro-
cedure requiring governmental approval of sales made by court execu-
tion was introduced."'
Customary rights in land posed a potential obstacle to development.
To overcome it state enterprises needing encumbered land are autho-
rized to address a request to the Minister of Rural Economy, who
examines the customary claims and then issues a decree of acquisition
and registration in the name of the state." - The procedure was made
more favorable to the tribes in 1962 by a decree requiring publication
of the notice of hearings on acquisition of tribal land for public use.
This was done in order to permit interested parties to exert their
rights.1
13
Mali has made no effort to follow Lenin's example of nationalizing
all land. Her leaders' policy is to respect existing rights, limiting their
exercise only for purposes of assuring that no poor Malian debtor be
treated unfairly. The policy of paying indemnities for property taken
for public use was also extended to cover unexploited buildings taken
for commercial or industrial purposes."-4 The decree charged officials
with making every effort to reach a friendly accord with the owner as
to valuation before any unilateral determination and ordered that if
the building were ever returned, the owners should be paid any dam-
ages resulting from use as estimated by a State Commission.
The State Mining Bureau has monopolized all valuable subsoil
108. Law No. 61-SD AN, Jan. 20, 1961, [1961] JORf No. 79, at 208.
109. Decree No. 41 bis, Jan. 26, 1961, [1961] JORM No. 77, at 189.
110. Decree No. 40 bis, Jan. 26, 1961, [1961] JORM No. 77. at 139.
111. Law No. 61-67 AN, May 18, 1961, [1961] No. 90, at XXIIL
112. Law of May 22, 1959, discussed by Blanc, supra note 107.
113. The procedure was applied in "Avis de demande d'immatriculation,' [1962] JORM
No. 121, at 447.
114. Law No. 63-53 AN, May 31, 1963, [1963] JORM No. 147, at 387.
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rights."5 Only public authorities may exploit precious metals and
gems,116 although these authorities may take the form of publicly
licensed prospectors' cooperatives as well as state enterprises. 117 More-
over, a state enterprise may assign its rights to private companies.""8
Land left in private ownership is, as in Rumania and Czechoslovakia,
subject to a stated policy of collectivization of agriculture, but Mali has
proceeded cautiously in this area. An Institute for Rural Economy was
established in 1960 to elaborate a program for agricultural planning.110
Basic crops may be purchased only at prices established by the state.1 20
Early emphasis was placed upon cooperatives by the organization of
the Action Rurale, charged with aiding farmers to form cooperatives
and with drafting laws on cooperatives.' 21 Similarly, the creation in
1965 of national as well as regional fishing committees promoted the
cooperative pattern among fishermen. 22 The commercialization of
cereals is completely in the hands of cooperatives.
23
To date the cooperative movement has been encouraged primarily
in the area of farm services. There has been nothing comparable to
Stalin's campaigns to spread producers' cooperatives in the form of
collective farms. Yet something of this nature may be coming since
each village has been encouraged to enlarge the "common fields," lands
traditionally tilled to meet community needs. Keita suggested in 1961
that these fields be expanded by 1966 to a size computed at the rate of
one hectar for each family in the village. Every village was to establish
a "permanent team for labor" to spend one or two days a week working
on the family plots. 24 Presumably the additions necessary for expan-
sion of the common fields were to come from plots currently being
tilled privately, but no one ever explained how such transfers were to
be encouraged, or whether it was rather expected that virgin land
would be brought under cultivation.
Keita's Sixth Anniversary speech at the end of the plan in 1966
115. Law No. 61-68 AN, May 18, 1961, [1961] JORM No. 91, at XXIII.
116. Law No. 20 PG, Feb. 25, 1964, [1964] JORM No. 166, at 236.
117. Cooperatives are formed under Decree No. 15 PG, Feb. 3, 1964, [1964] JORM No.
163, at 177.
118. Law No. 64-3 AN, May 4, 1964, [1964] JORM No. 172, at 435.
119. Ordinance No. 59, Nov. 29, 1960, [1961] JORM No. 74, at 3.
120. As an example, see Order No. 225 AE-CP, March 4, 1961, [1961] JORM No, 80,
at 259, fixing the purchase price of rice from growers.
121. Law No. 61-66 AN, May 18, 1961, [1961] JORM No. 90, at XXIL Name changed to
Direction Nationale du D6veloppement Rural, Law No. 63-48, May 31, 1963, [1963] JORM
No. 147, at 386.
122. Decrees Nos. 89 and 90 PG, Aug. 6, 1965, [1965] JORM No. 203, at 423.
123. Decree No. 167 PG, § 2, Nov. 24, 1965, [1965] JORM No. 211, at 671.
124. M. KTrrA, supra note 3, at 79.
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reveals more of his thinking.- Now he is prepared to say that agricul-
ture must be transformed from a system of small individual and archaic
family production to one of large-scale socialist production by "giving
it gradually by stages new adequate structures which will permit better
equipping and staffing...." He thinks that the creation and develop-
ment of increasing numbers of rural agricultural groups will meet his
objective. This sounds like a move in the direction of the Soviet col-
lective farm.
Cooperatives are not to be restricted to agriculture. They have been
chosen as the desired form for expanding the productivity of artisans
and handicraftsmen as well.-'2  Although large numbers of artisans
are still to been seen working independently in Bamako, they were told
in 1962 that "their true interest resides in joining producers' coop-
eratives." The state has placed in demonstration centers (where they
are to be seen setting public examples) artisans willing to innovate by
using modem machinery in their crafts. Others are being induced to
join cooperatives by the offer of state loans to permit them to buy such
machines. The result is expected to be development in a "semi-socialist
manner," just as Lenin used to predict in the early 1920's.
Civil, Commercial, and Customary Law
As with other Marxist-oriented systems, Mali's leaders have shown
no haste in revising the law of privately owned property. The civil code
remains that of France, modified formally only by deletion of the chap-
ters on marriage and the family in favor of a new family code. This
leaves in force the important chapters on obligations in contract and
tort and that on inheritance.
How much the code has been changed in application is hard to say,
although Malian lawyers claim that socialist ideas have influenced the
courts. As with other Marxian socialist legal systems, the major such
influence is to be found in the withdrawal from the sphere of the code
of the previously important subject of privately owned productive
property, now made the business either of the state or of cooperatives.
A second influence is a tendency to aid debtors by protecting them
from any sharp practices on the part of those with whom they have had
to deal. Such limitations by statute include a general freezing of
125. Speech on Sixth Anniversary, supra note 18, at 4.
126. Vie CONPIoS 101-02.
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rents127 and the fixing of rents for new premises in accordance with
quality. 1
28
The new Code of Marriage and Guardianship replaced the corre-
sponding provisions of the civil code on February 3, 1962.120 It recog-
nizes only secular marriages and imposes a fine if a religious ceremony
precedes state registration. The primary target of the draftsmen was the
arranged marriage, and they made consent a requisite of validity. Still
tribal custom had to be met halfway, and Article 2 of the code reads:
"Every request to marry a woman or young girl pledged to another with
her consent is non-receivable." The fiance under the betrothal agree-
ment has the right to prevent the marriage of his fiance to another
until his expenses have been repaid, and judges are authorized to fix
the damages. Under tribal custom the gifts on the occasion of be-
trothal were great, and repayment could cause severe hardship.
Again, custom was met halfway in provisions that permit the giving
of gifts on the occasion of marriage. But by Article 3 a dowry, which
in Mali is a husband's gift to the bride's father or head of family on the
occasion of marriage, may not exceed 20,000 francs for an unmarried
girl and 10,000 francs for a previously married woman. In the event
of divorce on grounds of the wife's infidelity, the husband may demand
return of the gifts and dowry, and vice versa. An over-amorous hus-
band who exceeds the prescribed limits on gifts is subject to prosecu-
tion under the Criminal Code. 30
Marriages contracted in violation of the prohibition of polyandry-
or of polygamy for those husbands who choose monogamy at the time
of marriage-subject the culprit to prison terms and fines, unless a wife
who is the beneficiary of a monogamy has agreed to amendment of her
marriage contract. The option is designed to permit Moslems to follow
Islamic custom if they desire, but they too are liable to criminal penal-
ties if they exceed the Koranic prescription of four wives. Officials who
perform prohibited marriages are to be punished with the same penal-
ties.
The woman's role follows custom in part, for she is required to obey
her husband and enjoys his protection in return. A new feature gives
her civil independence with regard to her property, unless she chooses
127. Decree of Dec. 24, 1960, [1961] JORM No. 75, at 67.
128. Order No. 331 AE-CP, April 11, 1961, [1961] JORM No. 83, at 400.
129. Law No. 62-17 AN, Feb. 3, 1962, [1962] JORM No. 111, at 1. Also published In
R3.PUBLIQUE DU MALI, MINIS11RE DE LA JUSTICE, LA JusTICE EN RAPUDLIQUE DU MIALI 862
(Bamako-Moscow, 1965).
130. MAL CRIMINAL CODE art. 185.
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community property in the marriage contract. She has a duty to live
with her husband, the "chief of the family", but he has a corresponding
duty to receive her.
The code defies custom by forbidding repudiation of the marriage
contract. Moreover, in general, except in the event of the death of a
spouse, dissolution is permitted only upon a judicial finding of adul-
tery, personal excesses, cruelty, or serious injury rendering conjugal
life impossible; condemnation of a spouse to a severe and degrading
penalty; inveterate alcoholism; or impossibility of intercourse. The
wife also has the right to demand divorce if the husband fails to meet
her needs for food, clothing and housing, or to pay the dowry at the
end of the period of delay set in the marriage contract. In the latter
case there may be criminal prosecution of a husband who refuses with
evil intent to perform his obligation.
A Malian author explains this reform of the divorce law by saying
that "polygamy exists and cannot be rooted out without upsetting the
social structure, the economic base of the country communities."1'
The legislature could do nothing but correct excesses. Under custom-
ary law a husband who could not endure a wife arranged for him by his
parents was required to maintain the family collectivity by giving her
to another of its members. Moreover, the wife could be inherited by
one of the brothers on the death of her husband. The code had to be
framed within this context, and thus a woman remains a charge on the
family into which she has married. On the other hand her emancipation
is aided by the introduction of separate marital property, and she is
given the right to administer the home in the absence of her husband.
She is protected against the intervention of the clan or the family
collectivity. In short, in the view of the Malian author, "Malian law
concerning marriage and divorce draws its originality from the fact
that it found a way to conciliate the exigencies of social life with the
evolutionary current of the modern world."' 32
Labor and the Civil Service
Labor relations have, in the French tradition, been kept separate
from the civil law of contract. Mali inherited a liberal Labor Code,
based on the French model, and this code required only modest re-
131. Dicke Ousmane Boubou, La marriage et le divorce au Mali, 75 REcumL Px..Avr
319 (1965).
132. Id. 486.
The Yale Law Journal
vision and reenactment in 1962 to meet conditions of socialism.13 ' The
code rests on the constitution's preamble, which recognizes in the
French manner "for all men the right to work and to rest, the right
to strike, the right to join cooperatives or trade unions of their choice
for the defense of their professional interests." In traditional Marxist
style the rights are paired with the duties, so that the preamble pro-
vides that
Labor is a duty of every citizen, but no one can be forced to
perform any specific work except an exceptional service in the
general interest, equal for all under circumstances established by
law.
The location of these provisions in the preamble rather than in a
bill of rights in the body of the constitution follows French rather than
Soviet models, for to the Soviet mind preambles are not enough. Still,
the contrast is lessened by the fact that neither the Soviet nor the Malian
government accepts responsibility for providing specific jobs to the
unemployed. Rather, the promise is construed to entail only direction
of the economy toward full employment. Jobs derive from that, not
from court orders or a government employment office. The right to
work in Mali, as in Eastern Europe, is generally essentially a reaffirma-
tion of the right to protection against discrimination in employment.
The Labor Code provides a 40 hour week and spells out the other
basic provisions of the employment relation, leaving little to the indi-
vidual or collective contract. The right of dismissal is limited to cases
of the laborer's malfeasance or to circumstances provided in the con-
tract. In the absence of provision for a different time, one to three
months' notice must be given before terminating a contract (depending
on the importance of the position held), except when there has been
serious fault. Damages are payable to the victim of an abusive termina-
tion; an employer who has induced breach is held jointly responsible
with the worker for damages caused. Even if there has been no induce-
ment to breach, the second employer is liable if he knew of the original
contract or continued to employ the worker after learning of his
breach.
Collective bargaining follows French rules. Mixed commissions are
formed by the Minister of Labor on demand of a labor union, the most
representative employer or the workers themselves. The agreement
must resolve specified matters listed in the code. After it has been con-
133. Law No. 62-7, Aug. 19, 1962, [1962] JORM No. 128, at 708.
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cluded, it may be extended as in France to apply to all enterprises in
the same branch of industry. Damages are recoverable in the event of
breach by either side.
Labor disputes may be submitted either to the Labor Inspector of the
Ministry of Labor or directly to the Labor Tribunal. The Inspector's
task is to conciliate, but in the event of failure, he transmits the case
to the Tribunal, which is a creature of the Council of Ministers named
on proposal of the Ministry of Justice after notice to the Ministry of
Labor. Representatives of employers and labor unions sit as assessors
under a chairman who is a magistrate. Hearings are public, and parties
may be represented by members of the Bar, trade associations or labor
unions. As is usual under Romanist procedures, the chairman bears the
burden of questioning and confronting the parties with witnesses. The
Tribunal makes a further attempt at conciliation before proceeding to
decision, but failing that, it decides the case on the basis of both law
and equity. Appeals are prohibited (except to the President of the
system) where the amount in dispute is less than 100,000 francs. A line
of appeal for the cases involving larger sums lies through the Social
Chamber of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, but only on
matters of law. If the parties refuse to execute the award, the matter is
taken to the Council of Ministers for a political decision when the
matter is of national concern. Strikes and lockouts are illegal during
the period of attempted conciliation.
The state services are subject to a special statute on organization
and recruitment, enacted in 1963134 and revised to form a "Labor
Code" in 1966.135 This statute is a civil service act, fixing classification
for all categories of service.
While the right to strike is enshrined in both the Constitution and
the Labor Code, Party policy opposes such methods of attempting to
influence results. A Party political commissar reviewing labor union
policy in 1962 described their unions' tasks as that of explaining to
workers
the need to increase productivity and production; to freeze wages
and prices; to initiate the monetary reform; and eventually to
raise the work norms which are susceptible to change on the
initiative of the unions themselves.Y1
The commissar noted that the Party had already placed labor union
134. Decree No. 247 PG, Dec. 21, 1968, [19543 JORM No. 161, at 48.
135. Text not yet available. For announcement, see L'Essor, Aug. 8, 1966, at 1, col. 1.
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representatives on the administrative councils of the Central Bank
and of the Import and Export company (SOMIEX) to open to the
unions other channels of influence. He also stated that such representa-
tives would soon be placed on the councils of all public corporations. 107
A few days later labor union participation was stressed in the report of
the Party's political secretary to the Sixth Party Congress.38 The
Party promised to raise the unions' position in all social activities
higher than ever so that they might fulfill their role as a "true school
of administration of the national economy."' 39
The unions were criticized for having decided on their own initia-
tive to vote "no" in DeGaulle's referendum after the Party had advised
a vote of "yes." Since the Party's recommendation had been accepted
by the voters, the Party commissar concluded that the "battle for the
primacy of policy over the unions had been won. 140
Mali's Party has had greater success in reconciling the unions to their
post-revolutionary functions than did Lenin's in the 1920's. Mali
sweetened the pill for unions that found that their role had changed
from pressing for advantage to executing plans established by the
Party, by enhancing the unions' place in enterprise administration. Yet
even here the role of the unions remains subordinate since Lenin's
model, which Mali's leaders have accepted, calls for predominance of
the enterprise director. It is he who is ultimately responsible for success
or failure.
The charter of the Office of Agricultural Products of Mali (OPAM)14 '
illustrates the relationship between directors and the unions in plants.
Article 20 of the Labor Code provides that "[t]he Director is personally
responsible for direction, administration, accomplishment of all tasks
and for development of the enterprise." The labor union's role is con-
fined to representation on the five-man Council of Direction together
with members of the administration and a delegate of the Party. The
pattern reminds one of Stalin's "triangle" of administration, labor
union, and Party representatives, which was abolished in 1957 under
threat of war and the need for quick and unencumbered administrative
decision, but which reemerged under Nikita Khrushchev as a "per-
manent production conference." The Director worked with the con-
137. Id. 101-103.
138. Vie CONGRtAS 105.
139. 2e SE NAnm 102.
140. Id. 97.
141. Law No. 65-7 AN, March 13, 1965, [19 65] JORM No. 195, at 177.
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ference in determining production policies, although he remained
at all times fully responsible for decisions.
Labor's position has been further enhanced in Mali by enactment of
a law on pensions'm and one on social security,143 without which no
state, socialist or not, can today meet the demands of its people. French
models were followed in drafting these two statutes. The problem in
these areas today is not a legislative one, but the financial one of obtain-
ing the economic resources to pay the bill.
Criminal Law
The draftsmen of the new Criminal Code were conscious innovators
They felt that the departure of the French called for drastic changes
from the French code which would reflect the great differences between
Malian and French conditions, morals, and traditions. In an unusual
preface to the new code, 144 they wrote:
The draft criminal code submitted to the National Assembly
constitutes a veritable renovation in the application to our popu-
lation of the law on repressive matters.
By way of illustration they cited a number of modifications. The
new code places the husband as well as the wife under threat of
criminal penalty for adultery or abandonment of the conjugal domi-
cile (previously only the wife had been subject to punishment); it
raises criminal penalties for political crimes and offenses, but elimi-
nates the penalties of deportation outside the country and detention in
a fortress (Mali has no outside territory, and she prefers to employ
convicts in useful public works); and it eliminates the French exception
from the laws against theft for thieving done within the confines of a
family (Malians preferring an ultimate court sanction in such cases,
knowing that a family brings a case to court only in despair of any
family solution). Other new offenses were the crimes of aggravated
alcoholism, outbidding other offers of dowry in order to obtain a
desired wife, and failure to pay a debt in bad faith. New definitions
were given vagabondage and begging, and the age of majority for
criminal responsibility was reconsidered. The new attitude toward
the Criminal Code was summarized in these words: "It must be a tool
142. Law No. 61-70 AN, May 18, 1961, [1961] JORM No. 90, at XVIL
143. Law No. 62-68 AN, Aug. 19, 1962, [19621 JORMI No. 128, at 749.
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for peace, for prevention of social trouble-not an instrument of
degradation of the social climate because of application without
knowledge of its provisions."
Nonetheless, Mali's code gives no hint of Soviet inspiration. The
thrust of the Soviet model is concern for the welfare of the group
rather than for protection of the individual. Thus, the Russian Re-
public's codes of 1922 and 1926 place emphasis upon the "social
danger" theory of punishment, then considered an innovation among
Italian theorists, rather than on the traditional "fault" theory. Soviet
courts retained this emphasis, although in diminishing degree, until
the post-Stalin reform of 1958 finally eliminated the judges' authority
to punish socially dangerous acts "by analogy."
Likewise, the Soviet model accents the "educational" over the
"retributive" approach to punishment. Except for political offenders,
its dominant objective is the criminal's speedy and profitable return
to society, or ideally his rehabilitation at the hands of his fellow
workers with no imprisonment at all. The death penalty was abolished
for periods in Soviet history, and when restored was declared to be
exceptional and temporary in character, although under Stalin it
was applied with noteworthy frequency.
Further, the Soviet codes graduate the severity of punishment ac-
cording to a set of values peculiar to the Soviet system. Thus, theft
or damage to state or cooperatively owned property is considered more
serious than the same acts committed against privately owned property.
Also, the conduct of commerce to obtain entrepreneurial profit is a
crime. Finally, the Soviet codes introduced some new crimes relating
peculiarly to socialism, notably to state economic planning. Officials
directing public corporations are subject not only to dismissal for
failure to meet their quotas, but to criminal penalties as well, and the
penalties apply as well to officials who produce the quantity but not
the quality required by the plan.
Mali's penologists have ignored all of this distinctive Soviet crimi-
nology. No reference is made to the "social danger" theory as the basis
of the code. There is not even an introductory article, as in the Soviet
codes, declaring its purpose to be the protection of socialist society.
The French code's emphasis upon fault as a requisite for punishment
is retained. Malian jurists vigorously condemn the pre-1958 Soviet
punishment "by analogy" as having no place in their society.
Although it appears frequently in the code, the death penalty applies
to fewer crimes than in the Soviet model. It is reserved for various
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forms of treason,145 for murder,140 armed robbery or robbery by
bands,147 arson,'4 8 destruction by explosion of habitations,14 and finally,
poisoning of wells from which death results.2' ° There is no capital
punishment for the economic crimes of theft of state property, bribery
of officials, counterfeiting, or currency manipulation. Until 1964 the
code did not even include a heading for "economic crimes." Directors
of state enterprises are subject to no criminal penalty for failure to
fulfill tasks set in the economic plan. Conducting private business for
entrepreneurial profit is not a crime at all, and theft of state and
cooperatively owned property is treated as no more serious an offense
than theft of privately owned property.' i'
Indeed, the penal innovations attributable to socialism are hard to
discern. The only ones that might be traced to Marxist inspiration are
the definition of vagabondage, and the 1964 amendment establishing
"economic crime." The article on vagabondage' 52 opens with the
phrase, "Labor is a duty of every Malian. In consequence vagabondage
is an offense." Even this offense and its treatment differ from the Soviet
model. There, under legislation introduced by Khrushchev failure to
perform socially useful labor was made the crime of "parasitism,"
punishable by banishment from the community for periods of up to
five years upon a vote of a general meeting of neighbors or fellow
workmen. While subsequent amendments substituted court decisions
for the vigilante process, the accent continued to be on punishment by
social opprobrium. Mali avoids this approach. Vagabondage is punished
like any other offense in the code by trial in the ordinary way.
A 1964 amendmen' 5 3 introduced the concept of "economic crime"
into the code in a form perhaps inspired by the Soviet model. Fraud,
contraband and other voluntary and premeditated infractions com-
mitted against economic, financial and banking institutions were made
punishable, but much less severely than in the Soviet Union. The
offender's property is confiscated and he is disqualified for a ten year
period from his civil rights and from employment in state agencies.
But Malians eschew imprisonment for such offenses and show no
145. MAL CRBnNAL CODE art. 29-36, 44, 47, 48.
146. Id. art. 160-62.
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tendency to classify them as Stalin did as "sabotage," for which the
penalty might be death.
In sum, the socialist influence on criminal law in Mali has been
nominal. Notwithstanding the draftsmen's proud claims of originality,
the major characteristic of the criminal code is the retention of French
practice, modified slightly to meet Malian conditions in the details out-
lined in the code's preface.
The Judicial System
French influence is again paramount in the structure of the three
major institutions of the judicial system-courts, prosecutors and bar
-and also in the allied institution of the state notary. The constitu-
tion sets the stage with the conventional declaration in Article 42 that
"The Republic of Mali assures and guarantees the independence of
judicial authority, the guardian of individual liberty charged with
the application in its own domain of the laws of the Republic." What
difference there is in the approach to the judiciary is in attitude, not
in legal terminology. Thus, all state officials, including those serving in
the judicial system, have the duty to be militant in their espousal of
policies established by the party, of which they all are members.
An African author writing from Senegal has seen in Mali's approach
to judicial officials an imitation of the approach of certain socialist
republics,154 and has found it possible to conclude that "the judicial
power in the Western sense of the term has no existence of its own
but is absorbed in the executive power." Such a conclusion probably
requires modification after the events of 1965 discussed below, but it
calls attention to a mood which must not be overlooked in evaluating
Marxian influence upon the mechanism that administers justice.
Clearly, there has been a conflict in Mali between two schools o[
thought on the role of the judiciary. While both favor political mili-
tancy for judges, one school thought that a political court apart from
the judicial system was necessary to attend to political matters such as
the conduct of referenda and elections, the constitutionality of drafts
presented to the legislature and of administrative acts, and claims filed
by civil servants against the state. The other wanted to merge what had
been a jurisdiction similar to that of Napoleon's Conseil d'Etat with
the regular court.
154. M. JEOL, LA MIFORME DE LA JUSTICE EN AFRUEqU Noint 141 (1963).
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The political school won the first round and established their court
by constitutional provision as a Cour d'Etat, but a concession was made
to the other school in that appeals from the claims section went to the
Supreme Court. By 1965 the overlapping jurisdictions had caused such
confusion that the Party found it necessary to discuss the matter. Pro-
posals were made to abolish the Supreme Court and established the
Cour d'Etat as the sole court of last resort, but the final decision went
the other way. The three sections of the Cour d'Etat were added to the
Supreme Court and the Cour d'Etat was abolished, in dramatic testi-
mony to the triumph of the men of the law.1 3 The merger was in fact
easier than had seemed possible because the claims section had never
heard a case. There was, therefore, no pending business to be trans-
ferred, but only a staff of 29 persons who were absorbed without
difficulty.
The merger established a single unified court system. Even the
customary law tribunals, which existed as separate entities under the
French, are no longer separate. Rather, customary law problems go
before the regular courts sitting with lay experts to assist the career
judge.156 The system now comprises Justice of the Peace courts with
both civil and criminal jurisdiction, Courts of First Instance for more
serious cases, a Court of Assizes in the French manner for the most
serious offenses, a Court of Appeal, and a Supreme Court of the Re-
public.
No effort has been made to copy the Marxian socialist model by
popularizing the courts. Thus, no lay assessors sit in the courts, except
as experts in customary law cases or where required by French custom
in the Court of Assizes and the Labor Court. No judges are elected as
they are in the People's Courts of the U.S.S.R.; instead all are ap-
pointed for life except Supreme Court judges, who sit for five years.
Malians explain that because of the scarcity of trained men, appoint-
ment is the only efficient way to use manpower.
Mali has introduced no innovations in the organization of the Prose-
cutor's Office, the State Notaries or the Bar. The latter still represent a
liberal profession, subject to the control of the judiciary. Its members
have not become state functionaries as they have in Guinea.
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Procedure, both civil s5 and criminal,rs has been reenacted in new
codes, but on the French model. Malians say the influence of socialism
in this field has been to make courts more readily available to the
average man than before, and to reduce the cost of justice. Thus,
whereas before independence the Court of Assizes sat only once a year
to hear all accumulated cases of severe crime, today it is convened at
least every four months, and more often if need be. No longer do
citizens sit in jail for nearly a year awaiting trial. Also, before inde-
pendence the nearest court was in Dakar in what is now Senegal. Today
the court goes on circuit and the accused is tried in a sitting relatively
near his home. Defense attorneys are now assigned without charge to
the accused, and procedure has been simplified for certain types of
cases. All trials are public, even for treason.
Departure from the Soviet model is especially marked during the
preliminary investigation before trial, called the "instruction" in ac-
cordance with French practice. In the U.S.S.R. this stage of the pro-
ceedings is conducted by an investigating official appointed by the
Prosecutor. Although the investigator is admonished by the code to
hear evidence from both sides impartially, the Soviet Prosecutor Gen-
eral has indicated that abuses have occurred. In Mali, as in France, this
official is a magistrate, subject to the rules governing the judiciary and
in no way under the Prosecutor's control. Further, as in France, the
suspect has the benefit of counsel during the preliminary investigation,
while in the U.S.S.R. counsel is admitted only after the indictment
has been presented to the accused.
The Road Ahead
Mali may well be on the road to becoming the fifteenth Marxian
socialist state in spite of her notable divergence from the Soviet model
at various points. She has established an economic system reflecting
the traditional Marxist emphasis upon state industry and state eco-
nomic planning. Her private enterprise sector survives and is regu-
lated by a body of law patterned after the French Commercial Code.
But this mixed economy diverges no more sharply from the model of
157. Law No. 101 AN, Aug. 18, 1961, published separately as R*PULIQUEF DU MALI,
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militant communism introduced into Russia in 1917 than did Lenin's
New Economic Policy in the 1920's. Law in all spheres is conceived
to be "public law," as Lenin said it must be under Marxism. Strong
controls have been established over the capitalists through verification
by the State Notaries of substance as well as form when transactions
are registered, and also through the right reserved to the Prosecutor
General to intercede in any trial to protect state interests.
Very significantly, political direction is placed in a unique political
party, structured along Communist Party lines, although departing
from the Soviet model in name and in its mass admission policy. State
administration is left to a state apparatus in which the public partici-
pates, but far less than in the soviet system. Only at the village and
city level is there the beginning of a movement toward mass partici-
pation. The doctrine of separation of powers is rejected, so that even
the judiciary is under a duty to implement national policy as estab-
lished by the unique party.
Finally, and most importantly for those who categorize a system by
the stated goals of its leaders, there is a public commitment to Marxian
socialism as the embodiment of the "universal truth", unencumbered
by reservations. Keita has sought no fundamental modifications. He
has not declared, as has S6kou Tour6 of Guinea, that socialism is intro-
duced only as a means to help achieve abundance, after which the
people will decide whether to move on to communism or adopt some
alternative. Nor has he denounced with Senghor of Senegal the "dic-
tatorship of the proletariat" for making Stalin's state "a monster-all
powerful without soul." 159
Keita has placed his people on the orthodox Marxian socialist road
subject only to such adaptation as seems necessary to meet the special
needs of his Malians. If wishing can influence doing, there is nothing
to prevent the planned denouement desired by Marxists everywhere:
the course is set, the preliminary steps taken, the legal framework in
place. Some day abundance must come from the production lines,
society will be disciplined, and the state will wither away.
Can the world outside expect the final act to be played according
to the scenario? Much depends upon the answer, including the pro-
grams of technical assistance and economic aid offered by several gov-
ernments, notably, France, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the
People's Republic of China. A "lawyer-politico" would be brash to
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suppose that he can foretell the politics of those who will make the
final curtain calls, but where so much is at stake it is tempting to try,
at least by indicating the alternatives. There are strong forces at work
which may restrain progress toward entering the inner circle of
Marxist-oriented states. The two major ones requiring attention are
French influence and the heritage of African tribal life, especially that
of the Bambaras who total one quarter of the population and are by
far the largest of the twelve tribes now living in what has become
Mali. 160
French influence is represented in the Malian pack by two strong
cards: one economic and one cultural. Economically Mali needs ex-
tensive financial and technical aid. Her per capita income is low, as
has been indicated, and her known resources are modest. She ranks
behind much wealthier Senegal and even Guinea in the United
Nations report of national incomes.' 61 She has no reservoir of private
capital at home, and few resources to attract private investors, even if
she were willing to risk what Africans call "neo-colonialism" by in-
viting them to bid on economic development projects. She must rely
largely on grants from abroad made with as few strings as possible
attached. France is potentially the main source of aid, partly because
of DeGaulle's desire to maintain prestige for France and her language,
and partly because French leaders retain a genuine affection for the
peoples for whom France felt herself so long the guardian. Mali's
leaders are somewhat afraid of Paris bankers, as evidenced by their
withdrawal from the Franc zone, but so many Malian leaders have
been educated in France or have worked with Frenchmen that there
is more mutual understanding than meets the eye of the foreign
visitor.16 2 If French politicians can see their way to budgeting large
sums of money for Mali, perhaps over the objections of less world-
minded French taxpayers, Malians are likely to respond by holding
to a middle road of non-commitment to the Marxian socialist family
and non-acceptance of the complete Marxian institutional model.
They can be expected to avoid giving the French leadership reason
160. Bambaras total 1,011,000. The next largest tribal groups are Senoufos-Minlankas
with 370,000 and Peuls with 345,000. R. ADLOFF, WEST AriUcA: THE FrRENC SPEAKINO
NATIONS YESTERDAY AND TODAY 23 (1964).
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range of $151-200 a year; Guinea was in the third group, falling between $71-100; and
Mali in the fourth group falling between $51-70. Only Ethiopia and Upper Volta were
lower. FAO AFRICA SURVEY: REPORT ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF AFRICAN RURAL DEVELOPbENT
IN RELATION TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GROWTH 19 (Rome, 1962).
162. For a rich account of French rule, see R. MORCENTHAU, POLITICAL PARTIES IN
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to suppose that costs might as well be cut, advisers withdrawn, and the
task of maintaining the deficit economy and of molding cultural and
political institutions passed wholly to those likely to reap the reward,
namely the Communists of Eastern Europe and China.
Hostility to French politicians and especially to DeGaulle is not so
intense in Mali as it is in Guinea. France withdrew gracefully from
Bamako, but petulantly from Conakry. When Sckou Tour6 asked
DeGaulle in 1958 how he might become independent under the pro-
posed association, the French chief of state offered no alternative to
complete severance of ties with the metropole, including those that
were economic.163 Tour6 responded by advising his people to vote
"no" in the referendum, perhaps failing to assess as dispassionately
as Keita the economic need for an affirmative vote. Since separation
Tour6 has seen the spectre of a Frenchman behind every plot to un-
seat him. Keita has undergone no such traumatic experience, for
DeGaulle, having noted what France lost by its abrupt severance of
relations with Guinea in 1958, changed his tactics. When Mali joined
with Senegal in 1960 to ask for recognition of independence for the
federation they proposed, DeGaulle granted their request.10 4 Mali
inherited this independence from the federation after it was dissolved.
The difference between Bamako and Conakry in their relations
with Paris is evident even to the foreign visitor. Bamako's offices are
full of French advisers, her schools of French students and teachers.
Conakry's Frenchmen have all but vanished, and those that remain
have done so on their own individual initiative rather than on govern-
ment assignment. For Mali France remains, then, potentially a strong
source of economic and technical aid, as both sides seem prepared to
foster a relationship which serves each well.
French influence in Mali is perhaps even stronger because of a
second card, far less evident that the economic one. It is not to be seen
in the numbers of Frenchmen or in French-financed structures. It lies
unseen in the hearts and minds of large numbers of Malian intellec-
tuals, many of whom have been educated either in France or in French
schools in Africa. President Keita is a top rank graduate of the famous
French lycde near Dakar named for William Ponty. 16 5 Although this
school became a cradle of African nationalists, it instilled in many
prominent Africans strong humanistic values which were developed
163. Cowan, Guinea, in AFRcAN ONE PARTY STATrS 149, 167-71 (G. Carter ed. 1982).
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further when they continued their studies in France. Senghor was one
of these. He went on to graduate from the University of Paris with
the highest honors yet gained by an African, and he remained in
France for years, to teach and finally to serve in the French Army in
World War II during which he was captured by the Germans. On
his escape he served in the French Resistance.
Keita's personal history is less dramatic but no less significant. He
served in Paris in the Assembly of the French Union and finally in
the French National Assembly up to the very eve of independence.
For him France is no ogre, but rather a font of cultural values de-
serving of world recognition. While he has not embraced French
culture as completely as Senghor, he appreciates it more than does
Tour6, who has had no lasting experience in France. Tour6 personifies
the metropole more as the colonial power for which he worked as a
boy and whose capitalist enterprises he later opposed as a labor union
leader until, little more than a year before independence, he was
elevated to the highest government post held by an African in French
Guinea. In Keita's happier experiences is to be found some explana-
tion for his continuing respect for French culture and the ideals it has
espoused.
No outsider can identify with certainty the cultural elements that
influenced Keita's party's decision in favor of the men of the law in
the struggle over the role of the Supreme Court vis-a'-vis the Cour
d'Etat in 1965. Some of those who participated see the outcome as
the triumph of a right approach over a wrong one, and their criteria
of right and wrong seem to be grounded in French cultural values.
The same cultural influences may underlie the decision to leave no
gaps in the law when new codes were drafted, so as to preserve stabil-
ity.16 They undoubtedly provided inspiration for an editorial in the
party's newspaper, L'Essor, rebuking those who attacked the judiciary
by saying, "Without doubt there is a civic duty to speak out about
the manner in which justice is rendered, but this duty stops right
there, and must not push any one to dispute the social necessity of
having a judicial organization."'167
Yet, Mali's leadership will not match Senghor's stalwart defense of
the principle of stability of law in requiring that there be "autonomy
166. MALI CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, art. 231: "Matters not regulated by the present
code remain governed by the texts in force so far as their dispositions are not contrary
to those of the Code." A nearly similar provision appears in MALI CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCFDURE art. 593.
167. "Notre Fait du Jour," LEssor, Aug. 1, 1966, at 1, col. 4-5.
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of law vis-A-vis the party."'16 Mali's position is clear: the point of bal-
ance is placed somewhat nearer the pole of flexibility. L'Essor argues
in its editorial,
It is certainly good to concern oneself with the fate of delin-
quents, but to move from this position to one which forgets tie
fate of the victims and that of society in general is to fall into the
worst of aberrations. It is to support the guilty against society.
That is never to be countenanced.10
Keita also exhibited his differences with Senghor when the federa-
tion broke up in 1960 soon after its formation. The issue consisted, in
part, of differing ideas about what kind of leadership was necessary.
Keita insisted on a single ruling party on the Communist pattern,
while Senghor wanted a parliamentary system with parties responsive
to the will of the people. In sum, one can surmise from all that has
happened that Keita is imbued with French cultural values, but to a
lesser degree than Senghor, at least with regard to forms of political
leadership and the place of individuals in the community. On these
issues he is far more influenced than Senghor by his studies of
Marxism, his association with French Communists, and his Bambara
heritage.
What Keita retains of his Bambara heritage is an enigma to a
Westerner who is not an anthropologist. One can study the Bambaras,
but the weight of this influence is not easy to guage, even though it
provides the primary element of the "Africanism" which Keita de-
clares himself determined to preserve. There are various leads to an
understanding of this influence. A French anthropologist, in de-
scribing the life of the Bambaras, tells her readers,
We have seen that the social unit among the Bambaras was the
community; it is also the work unit and the economic unit. The
community owns all the goods which compose the spiritual and
material patrimony .... 170
Sdkou Tour6 in analyzing his tribesmen, some of whom are Bambaras,
has said as much:
Africa is essentially communaucratic. Collective living and so-
cial solidarity give to African customs a depth of humanism which
many people might envy. Because of these qualities an individual
168. L. SENGHOR, PLANIFICATION Er T-NsION MORALE, pt. I, at 46 (1963).
169. "Notre Fait du Jour," supra note 167, at 1, coL 3.
170. V. PAQuEs, Lvs BAmBARA 61 (Paris, 1954).
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in Africa cannot conceive of his life outside that of the family,
village or clan. The voice of the African people is faceless and
nameless.
171
The depth of communal feeling is exposed dramatically by a Su
Su, who left Guinea to come to the United States after witnessing the
beheading of his sister's betrothed for theft from a Bambara. He
records his shock in words quite incomprehensible to a Westerner:
"Boy that I was, I understood that even as his head was separated from
his body, his soul was separated from the body of his tribe. That, not
his death, was the real horror of what I had seen."' 2
With such emphasis upon community over individual, tribal atti-
tudes confirm rather than contradict those of Marxian socialism. They
even sanctify community more than does Marxism, for the latter pro-
fesses to have as its ultimate aim benefit to the individual, supporting
community only as a form of organization without which the individ-
ual in modern complex society becomes as flotsam upon the sea. Such
being the case, it is easy to agree with one analyst who concludes that
Mali's leaders' theories "represent a vague attempt at synthesis of the
old and new in African life."' 73 This situation has political meaning,
for it suggests that a Marxian socialist pattern of organization will not
be resisted by the masses if they remain loyal to their tribal traditions.
One can even agree with David Apter when he says,
In Mali, for example, underneath a rather puritannical brand of
Marxism... can be seen subtle but significant connections to the
centralized politics of the ancient Bambara kingdom. The Pres.
ident of Mali, a descendant of the old Keita royal clans, is a
president who walks like a king.'7
4
Rather than providing a source of opposition to Marxist ideas,
tribalism offers a fundamental support, so long as some of the points
on which Marxism would split with tradition are not pressed too in-
sistently. One such issue is that of monogamy, and the material re-
viewed suggests that the leadership is proceeding very slowly in
reformation of marriage. Another is agriculture, where tribal custom
has evolved a compromise between traditional common tilling of the
land and private tilling by families. Keita favors extension of the com-
171. Cowan, supra note 163, at 193.
172. PRINCE MODUPE, I WAS A SAVAGE 27 (1957).
173. Grundy, Mali: The Prospects of 'Planned Socialism' in AFRICAN SOCIALISM 191
(W. Friedland & C. Rosberg eds. 1964).
174. D. ArEr, THE POLrics OF MODERNIZATION 81 (1965).
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mon fields to include the whole village economy, but he has not made
collective agriculture compulsory.
Still a third element is the role played by traditional elites. Keita's
discipined, politically oriented, Marxist party has no room for those
members of the traditional elite who are unwilling to conform to the
new model. An astute anthropologist with wide experience in West
Africa has noted in many of the one-party states a reversion to tribal
structure coupled with a strengthening of traditional elites among
people who are not receptive to mass mobilization except in interna-
tional crises.175 In his view, Mali presently represents a theater of
successful mobilization under a political party of an action type; but
retrogression may already be setting in, for as early as 1963 the party
established special schools for party cadres, and leading cabinet min-
isters took six weeks from work to supervise these schools. He might
have added that every issue of L'Essor is devoted to impassioned calls
to service in construction of the new Mali, and this may herald fur-
ther difficulties in creating the "avant-garde" party necessary to hasten
modernization of society in a Marxist mold.
In sum, if the influences surveyed have been seen correctly, the
restraints likely to come from forces outside Marxist ideology on Mali's
progression down the road to full membership in the Marxian so-
cialist legal family on any formal basis do not lurk in tribalism, so long
as the change is not too rigorously enforced on family custom or in
agriculture, and so long as political education is promoted with fervor.
The potential limitations lie hidden primarily in the hearts of men
imbued as youthful intellectuals with French humanistic culture, even
when they have not accepted conversion to Christianity, and also in
the minds of French politicians currently interested in maintaining
France's affectionate generosity toward Mali.
There remains one further factor which may be a counterweight to
both restraints: the Marxist education of the men putting or about
to put their feet on the ladder of power. It is this which has aroused
one analyst to conclude that, "communist theses, arguments and prop-
aganda are already playing a big role in Bamako." 70 He finds also that
various government departments, the trade unions, women's and
youth organizations, and even the Party are falling into the hands of
175. Wallerstein, The Decline of the Party in the Single-Party African States, in
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orthodox Marxist elements. Some of these men and women have been
trained in Soviet universities, and some by Soviet teachers in Mali.
Indubitably, some transformation through education is occurring, al-
though students have not, perhaps, accepted the lessons taught as
thoroughly as might be supposed. There are well stocked libraries of
Marxian and Soviet literature in French translation in Bamako, but
reports suggest that it is the rare student who reads this literature
avidly, if at all. The quality of Soviet-sponsored education lags, partly
because Soviet teachers have neglected French for many years and only
now are seeking to catch up. Some Malians who return from Eastern
European schools are unhappy with their treatment by townspeople
there. Factors such as these tend to reduce the favorable impact of
Marxist education, but the impact is present and continuing and no
effort is spared to increase it.
But, Marxist education and Soviet aid could be completely con-
taminated if the Soviets were to indicate at any time a desire to dom-
inate. When pressed too hard, Tour6 turned against those he thought
his friends and embarked on his own theoretical and institutional
path, as Senghor had done before him under a like threat to power.
Nationalism runs strong in West Africa, even among those who are
oriented toward Marxism, and it could be awakened also in Mali to
the detriment of Eastern Europeans and the Communist Chinese. The
words of a Nigerian Roman Catholic priest might be prophetic if
Marxists from abroad press too hard. In his view some of the self-
declared orthodox Marxists of Africa are "incapable of liberating
themselves from their colonial intellectual enslavement.'"17 At the
moment they can see the potential of "neo-colonialism" only in the
old imperialists, but if the fountain-head of Marxism were to threaten
enslavement of a new sort, there could be a sudden change of view.
He explains African socialist motivation as "an expression of the de-
sire of all Africans to find themselves, be themselves, and assert them-
selves. It is a crystallization of the African genius and a declaration of
ideological independence in a world flooded with learned masters."'18
(Emphasis in original.)
Thus, if the African personality were to be threatened or appear to
Malians to be threatened by Communists from abroad, there could
be swift severing of what appears to some to be an umbilical cord link-
ing the youthful Malian state to the Marxist ideological camp. The
177. BFDEi ONuoHA, TnE ELEmvEns OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM 30 (1965).
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consequences of such a rupture might will be reflected in future insti-
tutional development. The end would come to acceptance of "the
eternal truth of Marxian socialism," and Mali might turn as Senghor
has turned, to foster a "mutation" into a new kind of socialism, re-
jecting institutional development in the Marxian model. It might
strike out on its own on a novel socialist-oriented path, but with a
hand held out to non-Marxist states, notably France, for help which
would smooth the way by providing both economic aid and the institu-
tional advice which commonly accompanies such aid.
